Effective Job Search Practice in the UK's Mandatory Welfare-to-Work Programme for Youth by White, M. & White, M.
esearch
PSI Research Discussion Paper 17
Effective Job Search Practice in the UK's 
Mandatory Welfare-to-Work Programme for Youth 

Michael White
R
D
P
iscussion
apers
Policy Studies Institute, 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright holder. 
ISBN: 978-0-85374-829-8 
PSI Report No: 895
Policy Studies Institute
esearch Discussion PapersR
For further information contact:
Publications Dept., PSI, 50 Hanson Street, London W1W 6UP
Tel: (020) 7911 7500 Fax: (020) 7911 7501
PSI is a wholly owned subsidiary of the University of Westminster
© 2004
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Data for this study were provided by the UK's Employment Service (subsequently
Jobseeker Analysis Division, Department for Work and Pensions), which also
provided financial support for preliminary stages of analysis. The methodology
adopted owes a great deal to suggestions from Dorothe Bonjour, James Riccio, and
Jeffrey Smith, and these, along with Alex Bryson, Richard Dorsett, Genevieve Knight,
and David Wilkinson have made helpful comments on previous drafts. The usual
disclaimers apply.
esearch Discussion PapersR
 1
Abstract 
 
Administrative data from the UK’s main welfare-to-work programme for unemployed 
and disadvantaged youth is analysed to identify differences in practice between local 
delivery areas, and to assess their effects on off-welfare outcomes.  The findings 
reveal important similarities in the nature of effective ‘work first’ practices between 
this programme and some US programmes, despite large differences in the welfare 
context and systems.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The USA and the UK are the two countries that have to the greatest extent embraced 
welfare-to-work programmes with an emphasis on job search, or ‘work first’.  There 
is substantial evaluation evidence that points towards the efficacy of work-focused 
programmes and job search services in both countries.  A review focusing on early 
experimental programmes offering job search services for UI claimants in the USA 
(Meyer, 1995) indicated that these were generally effective.  Related findings are 
presented as part of a more extensive review by Gueron and Pauly (1991).  The 
evaluation of the California GAIN programme for AFDC recipients (Riccio et al., 
1994), also based on an experimental (random assignment) design, revealed a striking 
contrast between results from the Riverside work-first version of GAIN and those of 
the five other counties in this programme, and has been widely influential.  In the UK, 
positive impacts were found in an experimental evaluation of mandatory job search 
interviews for unemployed claimants (White and Lakey, 1992; Dolton and O’Neill, 
1996).  Similar impacts have been estimated non-experimentally (see the next section) 
for the New Deal for Young  People (NDYP), a programme with a substantial work-
first component.  NDYP constitutes the empirical focus for the present paper. 
 
There has also been a growing interest in getting inside the “black box” of programme 
evaluation to develop a more detailed understanding of what may be called micro-
policy, micro-design or micro-implementation (after Berman, 1978).  Mead (1997), 
for example, argues that evaluations should be followed by comparative studies of the 
performance of administrative units to elicit policy lessons.  Some earlier studies in 
the USA, of a partly qualitative nature, were orientated in this way.  For example, 
Chadwin, Mitchell and Nightingale (1981) based their assessment of WIN (the Work 
Incentives Programme) on a cross-State analysis and on more intensive study of 
service delivery units within five high-performing and five low-performing States.  
Among their wide-ranging conclusions, they asserted memorably that “programme 
management matters”.  Recently, interest in what makes programmes work has been 
connected to detailed analysis of area-based differences in programme governance, 
administration and delivery.  This type of research seeks to identify processes or 
mechanisms by which programmes produce their effects, thus strengthening 
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confidence in the causal nature of those effects as well as providing more solid ideas 
for future programme design.  An example is the paper by Riccio and Orenstein 
(1996) that developed further interpretation of the GAIN programme through analysis 
of richer, local data. A wider analysis of local programme characteristics, across 
several programmes, has also been produced by Bloom, Hill and Riccio (2001; 2003). 
Breaking into the black box and developing a more detailed analysis also raises 
complex issues of research methodology (see Mead, 1997; Heinrich and Lynn, 2000; 
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill, 2000).  It is important to address these difficulties in order to 
make further progress in developing this field of inquiry. 
 
The present paper seeks to contribute to these recent developments in three ways. 
First, it applies local-area analysis to data from the UK’s largest welfare-to-work 
programme. This, the first such application in the UK, offers findings which can be 
set alongside those from the USA, thus increasing the generality of findings about 
programme delivery processes for welfare-to-work programmes1.  Secondly, the 
present research is based entirely on the use of administrative data from the 
programme in question, rather than relying upon supplementary surveys to elicit 
information about local delivery practices. The paper illustrates how item analysis and 
scale construction procedures can be straightforwardly applied to administrative data 
defined at local level.  Thirdly, the paper addresses some methodological issues which 
arise in examining micro-details of programmes at the local policy level, notably the 
presence of ambiguity, endogeneity, or measurement error in explanatory aggregate 
variables.  As local-area and “black box” analysis is extended, it is important to 
incorporate methods of dealing with these issues. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses related literature 
concerning programme variations.  The third section describes the youth programme 
which is the focus of the research, and the data which was utilised.  The fourth section 
discusses the methodological issues, and describes the research methods used.  The 
fifth section presents the results, including sensitivity analyses.  The findings are 
discussed, and conclusions are drawn, in the sixth and final section. 
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2. Concepts and previous research on local variations in 
programmes 
 
A basic distinction is between ‘macro-implementation’ and ‘micro-implementation’ 
of programmes (Berman, 1978).  Sandfort, Seefeldt, and Danziger (1998), applying 
this distinction, interpret macro-implementation as consisting of parameters 
established by high-level administrators “to structure the service delivery system”.  
Micro-implementation, on the other hand, they interpret in terms of the decisions 
about service technology which are made at lower level within the front-line 
organizations that deliver the programme.  Evidently, such lower-level decisions take 
place within a discretionary space which has either been purposely devolved to the 
front-line organizations, or which has been left vacant for them to colonize at their 
own initiative.  Examples of macro-implementation variables within Sandfort and 
colleagues’ study of PRWORA in Michigan, include the proportion of Work First 
providers by county and the proportion of non-profit agencies by county.  Examples 
of their micro-implementation variables include the proportion of provider agencies 
imposing a requirement of immediate job search, and the proportion offering 
workshops to develop job search and job retention skills. 
 
Both macro and micro variation can be further elaborated.  All research in this field 
recognizes the need to take account of contextual variables reflecting economic and 
social conditions (a context important for macro-implementation decisions), and 
equally of the characteristics of clients (which are likely to influence micro-
implementation).  Recently, there has been growing interest in organizational issues 
around programmes, notably governance, management, and structural form (e.g., 
Heinrich, 2000; see also Considine and Lewis, 1999).  These may involve both macro 
and micro elements, and are likely to be influential whatever the type of programme 
in view.  
 
Any attempt to bring together all these levels is inherently complex.  A near approach 
to such a synthesis is provided by Lynn, Heinrich and Hill (2000) who put forward a 
“reduced form logic of governance” for public management research.  Their 
framework includes “structures” (incorporating a wide range of organizational 
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variables), “management”, and “treatments” (all aspects of service definition and 
application), as well as environmental (contextual) and client characteristics.  They 
argue that for service outcomes or outputs to be successfully modeled, all these types 
of variables need to be taken into account.   Even though their paper constitutes an 
unusually extensive review of relevant variables, the authors emphasize that they 
regard this framework as a preliminary step, and indeed it is possible to point to some 
simplifications in their account, vis-a-vis the previous literature.  Notably, their 
concept of treatments somewhat elides the distinction between macro- and micro-
level programme design variables which has fruitfully been made by the authors cited 
earlier. 
 
Research evidence on local variations in outcomes illustrates the foregoing concepts 
in terms of concrete variables. Illustrative of studies looking at governance-level 
variables are those of Jennings and Ewalt (1999), and Heinrich (2000).  The former 
considered the coordination instruments used by Service Delivery Area (SDA) 
management, and whether or not JTPA organization was consolidated with that of 
Wagner-Peyser Act programmes.  Both types of integration proved to have a positive 
bearing on several outcomes.  Heinrich (2000) found a particularly clear influence of 
the use of performance incentives in contracting with service providers, as well as a 
number of variations between for-profit and non-profit services.  Managerial variables 
have been explicitly considered in the follow-up investigations on GAIN and other 
programmes (Riccio and Orenstein, 1996; Bloom, Hill and Riccio, 2001; 2003).  The 
former study, for instance, noted that job placement standards were used by 
Riverside’s management as a criterion in performance assessment for caseworkers, 
while the latter examined the consistency of supervisors’ and caseworkers’ 
interpretation of the task (which presumably reflects communicative and control 
dimensions of management).   
 
Turning to ‘treatment’ variables at macro-design level, the Charleston Placement 
Demonstration systematically varied the amount and intensity of job search 
assistance: impacts corresponded to the programmemed intensity level (Meyer, 1995).  
Somewhat similarly, Heinrich (1998) reported positive effects from intensive services 
targeted on an especially disadvantaged local community. Another programme design 
dimension, of particular significance for job-search or ‘work first’ types, is the 
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voluntary or mandatory nature of participation (e.g., Riccio and Hasenfeld, 1996; 
Mead, 1997). Relatedly, Schiller (1999) showed how changes in welfare rolls at State 
level depended partly on the nature of waivers from federal regulations adopted by the 
States, which shaped their versions of welfare programme reform along a ‘soft-tough’ 
dimension. 
 
Treatment variables can also differ significantly at the micro-implementation level.  
The between-county differences in the GAIN programme can largely be classified 
under this heading.  Both the Riverside version of the programme, with its emphasis 
on work-first, and the Alameda version with its strong encouragement for clients to 
enter education, were consistent with the overall GAIN framework, but that 
framework was flexible.  The extent of permitted discretion in such cases means that 
between-site variations cannot necessarily be reduced to a matter of service intensity, 
as they can operate along different dimensions. Riccio and Orenstein (1996) 
discriminate multi-dimensionally between GAIN sites in terms of personalized 
attention, and enforcement including through use of sanctions.  In a more extensive 
JOBS analysis, Bloom, Hill and Riccio (2001; 2003) use a “quick job entry” scale, 
personalized attention, and monitoring among their discriminators.  In the Michigan 
PRWORA study by Sandfort, Seefeldt and Danziger (1998), an emphasis on focused 
job search assistance was found to have a negative relationship to aggregate 
employment outcomes, while the use of workshops to enhance job search skills was 
found to have a positive relationship. 
 
Empirical research therefore gives good support to the argument of Lynn, Heinrich 
and Hill (2000) that a wide range of variables needs to be taken into account in the 
modeling of variations in public service outcomes. This is not to say that a standard 
set of variables can be applied. The particular selection of variables and the way they 
are used to frame hypotheses remain matters for judgement in the context of the 
specific programme.  None the less, the broad concepts outlined in this section were 
found helpful in developing the research strategy to be described below.  
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3. The programme and data sources 
 
New Deal for Young People (NDYP) is one of the largest and certainly the most 
costly welfare-to-work programme in the UK.  It commenced in April 1998. Its aim is 
to help young people (aged 18-24) who have been unemployed for six months, or who 
fall into a number of disadvantaged categories (disabled, ex-prisoner, etc.), to find 
jobs and to increase their employability. In the UK, welfare benefits for unemployed 
individuals are not conditional on insurance, and only a small minority of claimants 
have unemployment insurance eligibility.  Moreover, in common with some other 
European countries, unemployment benefit claims are not time-limited. Moving 
clients off welfare therefore has large and long-lasting implications for public 
expenditure. 
 
A central feature of NDYP is the provision of a caseworker service, known as 
Gateway, with a ‘work first’ focus. The caseworker, known as a Personal Adviser, 
carries out an assessment of needs and provides support and monitoring for the 
individual to find a job, over a period intended to continue for up to four months from 
the time of entry (in practice, this often extends to six months). Those participants 
who do not find a job then pass into one of a number of further programme ‘options’: 
a waged job with subsidy paid to the employer, an unwaged work experience 
placement in the non-profit sector or in public sector environmental projects, or a full-
time classroom-based vocational education course.  These further placements can 
continue for up to six months (or up to 12 months for classroom education). If a 
waged job has not been obtained by the end of the placement period, the individual is 
required to return to a ‘follow-through’ period of supervised job search, closely 
similar to the initial Gateway period.  This follow-through period continues for up to 
13 weeks. All stages of NDYP are mandatory for the eligible group (if they remain on 
welfare). 
 
The presence of the work experience and education options in addition to the ‘work 
first’ component creates scope for varying interpretation. Are the options intended as 
a deterrent which enforces focused job search, since those failing to find paid work 
know that their situation will default to option participation?2  Or is the aim rather to 
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sift out those clients unable to compete in the job market, and then remedy their 
disadvantage through work experience and education? The initial governance design 
of the programme deliberately left flexibility to the local agencies to adopt their own 
interpretations (Department for Education and Employment, 1997), so as to adapt to 
local conditions and local stakeholder preferences. This was in contrast to the highly 
centralised specification and control of previous welfare-to-work programmes. This 
local flexibility, coupled with the breadth of the programme itself, makes NDYP a 
particularly valuable opportunity for assessing the effects of micro-implementation 
choices. NDYP was delivered through about 140 local agencies, known as Units of 
Delivery (UODs), with similarities to the SDAs (service delivery areas) in US 
programmes. 
 
NDYP also offered a new research opportunity in terms of data. During 1997-98, a 
New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED) was established.  This database collects 
information from a networked computer system on which front-line staff record 
service transactions with jobseeking claimants. Staff also record individual 
characteristics that are used in assessing eligibility or in performance monitoring.  The 
unit record on the database is the individual, with facility for multiple spell records 
within person. Locational information facilitates aggregation to the UOD and higher 
administrative levels. The present study uses a database extract for the period January 
1998 through August 2000. A further source of administrative information is a set of 
unit cost measures for each UOD, prepared centrally by the public employment 
service, for the period January-December 1998, inclusive.  
 
Several evaluation studies of NDYP have been conducted and all have found positive 
impacts of moderate size from the overall programme - around 5-9 percentage points 
reduction in welfare claiming (see  Riley and Young, 2001; Blundell et al., 2002; 
Wilkinson, 2002; White and Riley, 2002). However, Dorsett (2001) is the only 
previous study to focus on administrative data from the NDED, and his study was 
confined to estimating the relative impacts of the work experience and educational 
options. None of these evaluation studies has addressed the issue of local variations in 
micro-implementation. 
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4. Methodological issues, measures, and design of the 
analysis 
 
The existence of an extensive administrative database, including information on 
processes applied by front-line staff, confronts the researcher with the questions 
‘What measures should be selected?’ and ‘How can the selection be justified?’.  In 
answer to these questions, the following initial criteria are proposed: 
 
(a) the measures should exemplify programme features that are salient and offer scope 
for local variation in practice; and 
(b) the measures should be coherent and as far as possible distinct from other 
programme features. 
 
These criteria are related to general principles of face validity and construct validity 
that are widely used in questionnaire scale construction or test construction. If they 
are satisfied, these criteria ensure that measures are neither arbitrary (‘definition by 
labelling’) nor trivial. Criterion (b) more specifically guards against the potential 
threat that the measures may proxy policies other than those which they purport to 
represent. For example, Gittleman (2001) investigated the influence of State waiver 
policies on exit rates from welfare, but concluded that “anomalies in the results 
suggest that [waivers] are actually serving as a proxy for other state-level changes”. 
This situation, which might be referred to as ‘unintended proxying’, may arise either 
as a case of omitted variable bias, or as a misinterpretion of the selected variable.  
Unintended proxying, resulting from correlation of the given variables with 
unobserved variables can only be avoided (though perhaps never completely) by 
coverage of all the chief programme features through the selected variables.  To avoid 
misinterpretation, it is worth devoting effort to grounding and/or confirming the 
interpretation of key variables by statistical methods, especially the construction of 
multi-item composite variables.  In constructing multi-item measures, patterns of 
covariance between items are used to ground the interpretation of the measures, since 
interpretations are more constrained by item combinations than by single item 
measures.  Multi-item measures also serve to increase reliability, relative to single-
item measures. An additional possibility with programme evaluation is to examine the 
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patterns of effects over time, drawing on previous research findings to form 
hypotheses about the timing of effects. For example, ‘work first’ practices should 
show their effects quite rapidly during the periods when they are being intensively 
applied (see Riccio et al., 1994), while educational provisions would be expected to 
show their effects with considerable delay (Couch, 1992; Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 
2000).   
 
A futher threat in the analysis of welfare policies is that of the possible endogeneity of 
policy choices.  This problem has been recognized in macro-modelling of aggregate 
unemployment, whether cross-nationally (e.g., Bellman and Jackman, 1996) or 
regionally (e.g., Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995), but has received less emphasis in 
area-level research. The labour market or welfare policies at various administrative 
levels (and also the budgetary allocations from the centre to devolved levels) will 
often be influenced by current or recent experience of unemployment or welfare 
caseloads at each level.  Then, because of the tendency for aggregate outcomes to be 
influenced by unobserved variables that are persistent over time, attempts to model 
outcomes in terms of the policy choices are likely to be statistically biased3.  A 
common econometric response to this type of problem is the instrumental variables 
(IV) methodology, whereby the endogeneity of an explanatory variable is removed 
through use of another variable which is related to it, but unrelated to the outcome 
variable (Wooldridge, 2002). For instance, Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) used the 
party political composition at regional level as an instrument for welfare expenditures: 
the assumption is that political allegiance affects budget choices but not (at least 
directly) outcomes in the labour market.  In the type of situation considered here, a 
simple heuristic of whether or not endogeneity is likely to be present is whether or not 
the potential measure of local policy is uncorrelated with (or not predictable from) 
pre-programme values of the outcome variable (here, unemployment).  A significant 
relationship is suggestive of endogeneity, because unemployment is likely to be 
influenced by unobserved local circumstances which are persistent over time.  
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5. Measures of micro-implementation 
 
As a basis for systematic development of measures, the chief features of NDYP in 
relation to job-search activation were identified through a review of official 
documentation and from qualitative studies and reviews.  These features can be 
summarised as follows. (1) The amount of personal contact with front-line 
caseworkers, relative to previous provision, was greatly increased, with lengthy initial 
interviews and numerous follow-up interviews and telephone contacts becoming the 
norm (whereas previously caseworker interviews had been brief and widely spaced).  
(2) The scope for sanctioning clients for non-compliance was extended under NDYP 
with its widened mandatory provisions. (3) Additional resources were provided so 
that PAs could refer clients to external specialist services.  These included skills 
assessments, careers guidance, disability services, counselling, mentoring, and 
behavioral therapy. (4) The programme stressed the importance of giving scope to 
client choice. To assist in choosing post-Gateway options, clients could be offered 
short courses known as ‘tasters’ which permitted them to make informed choice based 
on a trial.  
 
From the administrative database, operational variables were selected to represent 
these features of NDYP.  All were constructed from the administrative database over 
the first six months of the programme (April-September 1998) by aggregation to the 
local area (UOD) level.  The emphasis was on identifying actions that are in the 
control of the front-line caseworkers, rather than on steps taken by the clients or 
dependent on other agents.  To clarify this point, the caseworker controls whether or 
not to refer the client to a basic skills assessment, whereas the occurrence of that 
assessment may depend on the service provider accepting the referral or on the client 
showing up for the appointment. It is the former rather than the latter variable that is 
considered in this analysis. 
 
The initial set of variables was then submitted to factor analysis and reliability 
analysis procedures to establish groups of variables which were distinct from one 
another and statistically reliable. Those factors with satisfactory reliability were then 
regressed on the average local (UOD) unemployment rate for 1997 (the year before 
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the introduction of NDYP), to provide an initial indication of potential endogeneity 
(see previous section). Two demographic variables, the youth ethnic minority 
proportion and the youth disability proportion, were also used as regressors.   
 
Table 1 shows the variables screened in this way and the results of screening.  It is of 
interest that the coarser measures of micro-implementation - numbers of job 
submissions and of submissions to options - did not pass these tests, either being 
correlated with pre-programme unemployment levels or forming part of weak factors. 
Also, referrals to external services had low inter-correlations with one another and 
with other variables, and so had poor scale reliability.  
 
Table 1  Micro-implementation item assessment 
Item description     Retained, or reason for dropping 
 
Number of interview actions    retained, factor JSE 
Days between 1st and 2nd interview   retained, factor JSE 
Number of sanctioning referrals   retained, factor JSE 
Number of education taster referrals   retained, factor IOC 
Number of work experience taster referrals  retained, factor IOC 
Number of environment-work taster referrals retained, factor IOC 
 
Number of job submissions    correlated with unemployment 
Number of submissions to option places  correlated with unemployment 
Number of basic skills referrals   weak factor  
Number of disability referrals    weak factor 
Number of unsubsidised job submissions  weak factor  
Days from ND start to Gateway start   weak factor & 
       correlated with demographics 
Days from ND start to option entry   weak factor & 
       correlated with demographics 
Number of subsidised job submissions  did not factor 
Number of mentor referrals    did not factor 
 
Note: ‘unemployment’ and ‘demographics’ variables refer to the pre-programme year. 
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Two measures passed all tests and were labelled 'job-search efficacy' (JSE) and 
‘individual option choice’ (IOC).   The JSE measure was derived as a principal 
components factor score loading on the average number of New Deal advisory 
interviews per client, the time-lag between the first and second interview, and the 
frequency of referrals to adjudication for benefit sanctions, all of which were inter-
correlated.  It thus combines elements from features (1) and (2) of NDYP: intensive 
caseworker contact, and sanctioning for non-compliance. This measure is 
interpretable as strength of local policy orientation towards the ‘work first’ dimension 
of the programme.  The IOC measure was a factor score loading highly on three 
measures of frequency of referral to different kinds of ‘taster’ courses for post-
Gateway options.  It represents feature (4) of NDYP and is interpretable as strength of 
local policy orientation towards encouraging individual choice, and facilitating entry 
to education and work experience components of the programme. These two measures 
were derived as orthogonal components in a factor analysis and are statistically 
independent of one another by construction. Both measures were unrelated to pre-
NDYP local unemployment and to minority and disabled proportions.   
 
Although the administrative database did not yield a satisfactory measure of the use of 
external services to support the job-search process, an alternative was found in 
another data source. A unit cost measure of Gateway services per NDYP entrant was 
available for 1998, at the UOD level. Importantly, this measure of expenditure 
excluded the costs of caseworker interviews and related administration, as well as the 
costs of welfare payments.  Thus the measure chiefly reflected external services 
contracted or purchased on behalf of clients. A high unit cost of Gateway can 
therefore be interpreted as indicating the local orientation towards using external 
services. The unit cost measure was not significantly correlated with the pre-
programme unemployment rate, and had only slight overlap with the other two 
measures (correlation 0.20 with JSE, 0.18 with IOC). However, the possibility of 
endogeneity cannot be excluded since the time-period over which costs were 
established overlapped with the period in which outcomes were measured in this 
research. It also seems likely that the unit costs contained a non-ignorable amount of 
measurement error (in particular, because the costing system was new, there could be 
some unreliability in cost centre coding).  It was decided to use this measure, labelled 
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‘external service costs’ (ESC), and to deal with the possible presence of endogeneity 
and/or measurement error by instrumental variables.   
 
6. Control variables 
 
Other variables included in the analysis, which are treated as controls, are of three 
main types: individual, contextual, and organisational.  The individual variables were: 
age, number of previous unemployed welfare claims, the duration of the welfare claim 
at entry to NDYP, disabled (dummy), minority group (nine dummies), eligibility 
criterion (13 dummies), sex,  marital status, the interaction of  sex and marital status, 
usual occupational group (10 dummies), and the interaction of sex and occupational 
group.  Labour market contextual variables were defined both at the individual level 
and the local aggregate level. At individual level, these were: the pre-programme 
unemployment rate for the travel-to-work area of the individual’s residence, the 
chronological week of entry to NDYP, and the square of this week number (these last 
two variables capture time-related variations in the labour market, such as cyclical 
effects and labour queues).  At aggregate (local area) level, the contextual variables 
were: region (nine dummies), rural/urban dummy, economically active population 
size, pre-programme unemployment rate, and home-resident student rate.  Note that 
two unemployment rates are defined, one representing the labour market conditions 
facing the individual, the other representing the average conditions for the UOD (the 
two measures are based on different spatial units and had a correlation of 0.5 at 
individual level).  Two organizational measures were available. The ‘delivery model’ 
classified the delivery areas by contractual type: public service, private sector, and 
mixed or partnership contracts. Additionally, a dummy identified certain of the 
delivery areas (N=12) which were selected to pilot the programme in advance of the 
national launch date.  
 
7. Method of analysis 
 
The analysis of programme outcomes uses a database extract covering all clients who 
entered in the period between October 5 1998 and 26 February 1999. The data extract 
contained 73,652 individuals, followed for a minimum period of two years. The data 
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covered all 141 areas. It was decided to exclude the 12 smallest areas, since these 
tended to have outlying values (both low and high) on a number of the variables 
which would be likely to reduce the reliability of the analysis.  After removing these, 
and a small proportion of cases with defective data, the cases for analysis numbered 
72,422 (98.3 per cent of the original extract). 
 
The analysis was in two stages.  The purpose of the first stage was to derive an 
aggregate (area) outcome measure that was adjusted for individual-level control 
variables.  The second stage sought to model this outcome at area level through the 
measures of micro-implementation, together with the aggregate-level controls. 
Instrumental variables (IV) estimation was used at the second stage to remove 
potential bias in the variable for unit cost of external services.  Ignoring IV, the 
models can be represented as follows: 
 
Yi = α1t + Xiβit + Djγjt  + εit (1) 
 
where Y is the outcome variable and X the vector of control variables defined over 
individuals i, D is the set of area dummies, Greek letters indicate parameters to be 
estimated, ε  is the disturbance, and subscript t (t = 1 ... 18) refers to monthly time 
periods for which the model is separately estimated (see also below); and 
 
gjt = α2t + Pjδjt  + Wjηjt + νjt  (2) 
 
where gjt  are the estimated area differences in outcomes (net of individual controls) 
from the first stage of the analysis (these corresponding to the γjt parameters of 
equation (1)), P is the vector of micro-implementation policy variables over areas, W 
the vector of control variables at area level, and ν the area-level disturbance term 
(which includes estimation error for the gjt ). The disturbance terms in (1) and (2) are 
assumed to be independent; this is the chief simplifying assumption by comparison 
with fitting of a linear hierarchical model. (Within-area correlations in (1), that are 
provided for explicitly in linear hierarchical models, can also be dealt with through 
the use of robust estimators in OLS and IV models: see below.)  
 
Model 2 can be written in more detail as follows: 
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gjt = α2t + δ1 jtJSE  + δ2jtIOC + δ3jtESC* + Wηjt + νjt  (2a) 
 
where the first three upper-case labels are the elements of P as previously defined, and 
the asterisk following ESC indicates that it is instrumented. Two instruments for ESC 
were used: the per-area proportion of individuals from ethnic minorities; and a 
dummy variable, formed by dichotomising the unit cost variable at its median point. 
The rationale for the instruments is as follows. From previous research it is known 
that, in the UK, minority youth tends to have low uptake of available labour market 
services, thus a high minority proportion tends to reduce unit costs4. However, after 
controlling for human capital and other characteristics, minority youth does not 
appear to have a lower employment rate following unemployment. Dichotomisation at 
the median was shown by Wald (1940) to be a method of removing measurement 
error bias, and Durbin (1953) showed that it is an instrument. Appendix 1 contains 
details of instrument test statistics, indicating that the instruments are strong and 
giving no suggestion of instrument invalidity. 
 
The individual-level outcome (Yi) was whether the individual was ‘off welfare’ at a 
given time-point, coded 1, or ‘on welfare’ at that time, coded 0.  ‘Off welfare’ means 
neither receiving unemployment-based benefits nor receiving benefits under NDYP. 
This outcome measure takes account of recurrent unemployment or recurrent return to 
NDYP. The aggregate, area-level outcome (gj) was the area’s adjusted difference in 
off-welfare rates relative to other areas at a given time point. The Yit and gjt outcomes 
were computed for every month from first entry into NDYP up to month 18, through 
separate analyses.  
 
For the individual-level analysis, linear probability modelling was used (i.e., OLS 
with a binary dependent variable).  The mean out-of-welfare rate was below 20 per 
cent in months 1 and 2, and the results for these months must therefore be treated 
cautiously (Cox, 1970).  However, for periods 3 through 18 they were always above 
20 per cent. The use of linear probability modelling, rather than nonlinear regression, 
facilitates subsequent interpretation. The second stage of analysis, at the aggregate 
level, was carried out by two-stage least squares (2SLS). At both the first and second 
stage of analysis, a robust variance estimator (the Huber-White estimator) was used.  
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At the first stage, this estimator takes proper account of the within-area correlations.  
At both stages, the estimator also takes account of heteroskedasticity. 
 
The availability of outcome measures over an 18-month period strengthens 
interpretation. As described earlier, job-search support is provided in principle during 
the first four (in practice up to six) months of NDYP, and in a further three-month 
period for participants who remained jobless following an education or work 
experience option. Access to ‘taster’ courses and referrals to external specialist 
services were concentrated within the initial four to six month period.  Thus, assuming 
these forms of client treatment are effective, each should have a somewhat distinctive 
pattern of outcomes over time associated with it.  Areas scoring higher on the JSE 
measure should have enhanced outcomes in or shortly after the initial six-month 
period, and also at a later stage (around months 12-15) when unsuccessful clients are 
returning for follow-through support.  In between, however, the advantage of the 
high-JSE areas will be reduced: so effects over time can be expected to be bimodal. 
Areas with a high score on the IOC measure are diverting clients from ‘work first’ 
towards education and subsidised work experience options, and this should result in 
reduced off-welfare outcomes during the initial six-month period.  Increasingly 
positive effects on outcomes could,  however, take place in the following year 
provided that more informed client choices lead to a greater efficacy of the options 
entered. Predictions in regard to the ESC measure are more ambiguous. If referral to 
external specialist services mainly serves to provide remedial treatment for clients, it 
seems unlikely that this would produce a short-term effect, and the gain from high 
ESC would be delayed somewhat similarly as from high IOC.  But if high ESC frees 
caseworkers from supporting individuals with the most severe difficulties and permits 
them to concentrate their efforts on supporting job-ready clients, then outcomes could 
be enhanced during the initial six-month period. 
 
8. Results 
 
Results for the first stage of analysis are not shown, since its purpose was simply to 
produce the estimated area-level differences in outcomes, adjusted for individual-level 
characteristics. However the extent of the area-level differences is of some policy 
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interest.  Averaged over the 18 months that were analysed, the standard deviation of 
the area coefficients (i.e., of the adjusted area-level off-welfare rates) was 4.2 
percentage points. This however varied over time, being higher in months 5 to 8 and 
lower both before and after. At month 6, the standard deviation was 6 percentage 
points, while the difference between areas at the 10th and 90th percentile points was 
14.8 percentage points. The between-area differences were therefore substantial even 
after controlling for a large number of individual attributes, most of which in fact 
were statistically significant in the first-stage analysis. 
 
The main interest resides in the second stage of analysis, where the micro-
implementation measures are considered as effects on the adjusted area-level 
outcomes.  The results concerning the micro-implementation measures are 
summarised in Figures 1-3 (details for the control variables are not reported here, for 
reasons of space, but full results can be obtained on application to the author).  
 
In Figure 1, the results are shown for the measure of ‘job search efficacy’ (JSE). 
Areas scoring high on JSE had above-average performance on the off-welfare 
measure over the whole period. The pattern showed the expected bimodality, with the 
effect rising and becoming significant at 5 months from entry, then staying on a 
plateau for several months, then dipping somewhat, and then rising to another peak at 
15 months from entry, which is just after the entry peak to the follow-through period 
for those still jobless. Thus, the interpretation of this measure as concerned with 
efficacious job search processing by caseworkers is broadly supported by the pattern 
of effects over time, in the context of this programme’s structure.  However, the effect 
of JSE was more persistent than expected, with a post-Gateway dip that was both 
delayed and brief: JSE was non-significant only in months 1-4 and 12-13. The 
simplest explanation is that this reflects variable rates of passage through the 
programme, with many individuals having extended stays in the Gateway process and 
many others leaving option placements early, and thus returning prematurely to the 
follow-through search process (see Bryson, Knight and White, 1999).  These 
variations would tend to spread the effect of JSE over a wider time-span. 
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Figure 1  Effect of ‘job search efficacy’ (JSE) on off-welfare rate 
Notes: Coefficients from 2SLS analysis (each bar a separate analysis). The effect is per unit standard 
deviation of JSE. The coefficients are significantly different from zero (5 per cent significance level) in 
months 5-11 and 14-18. 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the results for the measure of ‘individual option choice’ (IOC).  
Areas emphasising this aspect of the programme tended to have a depressed off-
welfare rate in the initial period of intensive job-search, with relative outcomes 
becoming significantly negative in months 7-9.  This is consistent with the 
interpretation that this approach tended to detract from the programme’s ‘work first’ 
impact. However, the analysis showed no positive impact over the latter half of the 
observation period, so there was no evidence of a short-term payoff.  
 
Figure 2  Effect of ‘individual option choice’ (IOC) on off-welfare rate 
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Note: Coefficients from 2SLS analysis (each bar a separate analysis). The effect is per unit standard 
deviation of IOC.  The coefficients are significantly different from zero (5 per cent significance level) 
in months 7-9 and 12. 
 
In Figure 3, the results are shown concerning the instrumented variable ‘external 
service costs’ (ESC*). Areas with higher expenditure on external services generally 
had somewhat above-average performance on the off-welfare measure, but this was 
significant only in months 5-7. Relative performance increased over the initial months 
to this peak level, and then fell back progressively although always remaining 
positive. In the context of this programme’s structure, this pattern is most consistent 
with the interpretation that use of external services for clients with special difficulties 
freed time for front-line caseworkers to focus on supporting other clients’ job-search. 
This is not to say that no remedial benefits were being obtained for the clients with 
difficulties. It is possible that these would not show through until a later time than that 
covered by this analysis.   
 
Figure 3  Effect of ‘external services cost’ (ESC) on off-welfare rate 
 
Coefficients from 2SLS analysis (each bar a separate analysis). The effect is per unit standard deviation 
of ESC (instrumented).  The coefficients are significant (5 per cent significance level) in months 5-7. 
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To illustrate the magnitude of effects, coefficients and t-statistics for the micro-
implementation variables are shown for months 6, 12 and 18 in the upper panel of 
Table 2. To facilitate comparison, the policy variables have been standardized and the 
effects are therefore per standard deviation (this also applies to Figures 1-3). 
Assuming normality, an area one s.d. above the mean on the JSE score had around a 
2-3 percentage point advantage in off-welfare rate compared with an area one s.d 
below the mean, during the12 months when JSE was significant. An area one s.d. 
above the mean in expenditure on external services spent about £85 ($140) more per 
client than an area one s.d. below the mean. During the three months when the ESC 
variable was significant, the difference in off-welfare rates for these two areas was 
around 3.5 percentage points. For the IOC variable, the negative effects on outcomes 
were of smaller magnitude. In the four months when the IOC variable was significant, 
the outcome difference was about 1.5 percentage points between areas above and 
below the mean by one s.d. 
 
9. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Heinrich and Lynn (2000) have argued that the use of an aggregate-level analysis is 
particularly vulnerable to misspecification and thus to the production of misleading 
results. To avoid this, we have used a prior stage to adjust the aggregate-level 
dependent variable for compositional differences, have paid due attention to the issue 
of endogeneity in aggregate policy variables, and have used robust variance 
estimation. To assess robustness further, an alternative analysis was carried out, with 
individual data but with both the individual-level and aggregate-level regressors 
included in the specification (and without area dummies). Also, instead of 
instrumenting the ESC variable, it was included in its dichotomised form, ESCHI. 
According to Heinrich and Lynn (2000), OLS models at individual level with this 
range of regressors generally provide a reasonable approximation to a full hierarchical 
model. A set of analyses for outcomes at months 1-18 was obtained through linear 
probability models.  
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Overall, this alternative set of models produced results which closely matched the 
patterns described in the preceding section. Unsurprisingly the estimates for the 
ESCHI variable were about half as large as for the instrumented ESC variable, but 
significance was at a similar level. Overall, the results do not appear to be sensitive to 
the specification adopted. Illustrative numerical results from the alternative 
specification, for months 6, 12 and 18, are shown in the lower panel of Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Illustrative estimates for the micro-implementation variables 
 
(a)  Area-level aggregate analysis (2SLS): effects on off-welfare rate in percentage 
points (JSE, IOC and ESC* standardised) 
     month 6 month 12 month 18 
     coeff. |t| coeff. |t| coeff. |t| 
Job search efficacy (JSE)    1.2 2.78   0.7 1.84   1.1 2.25 
Individual option choice (IOC) -0.7 1.80 -0.8 2.29 -0.1 0.43 
External service cost (ESC*)    1.9 2.28   1.2 1.51   1.0 1.35 
 
* Instrumented variable 
 
(b) Individual-level analysis including both individual and area regressors (linear 
probability model): effects on off-welfare probability in percentage points (JSE and 
IOC standardised, ESCHI a dummy)  
 
     month 6 month 12 month 18 
     coeff. |t| coeff. |t| coeff. |t| 
Job search efficacy (JSE)    1.3 2.71   0.8 1.89   0.9 2.30 
Individual option choice (IOC) -0.6 1.22 -0.5 1.25 -0.2 0.41 
External service cost high (ESCHI)   2.2 2.38   1.2 1.73   1.0 1.74 
 
10. Discussion 
 
In this research, three variables representing variations in local micro-implementation 
of a UK programme for unemployed youth have been identified through 
 23
administrative data. Two were found to have significant positive effects on the local 
aggregate off-welfare rates while the third was found to have negative effects. All 
three variables exhibited patterns of effects over time which could be plausibly 
interpreted as relating to job search, given the structure of the programme.  The 
findings pointed toward positive off-welfare outcomes resulting from a strong 
emphasis on ‘work first’ practices by front-line caseworkers. Practices contributing to 
positive outcomes were closely-spaced repeat interviewing of jobseekers, a large 
number of interviews (reflecting persistent follow-up), use of sanctions to enforce the 
mandatory nature of the programme, high expenditure on external services for clients 
(interpreted as a means of freeing caseworkers to focus on job-ready clients), and 
sparing usage of short courses that helped clients choose work experience or 
educational options. 
 
These findings are broadly consistent with US evidence concerning the positive role 
of ‘work first’ micro-implementation practices.  Indeed, the similarities to the GAIN 
evidence are particularly striking.  This research shows that the efficacy of welfare-to-
work practices is not peculiar to a national context. Despite the very different welfare 
systems of the USA and the UK, and the differently constituted client groups served, 
rather similar practices are found to be relevant to local reductions in welfare rolls. 
This is not to claim, of course, that practices of these types will be effective in every 
national context. The generality of the findings can only be extended through similar 
studies in other countries. 
 
The combined effect of the three micro-implementation variables was greatest around 
the sixth or seventh month from entry to the programme, that is, at and just after the 
end of the initial period of assisted job search. Later on, as clients continuing their 
welfare spells entered work experience and educational options, the importance of the 
‘work first’ practices naturally lessened, but they did not disappear even at 18 months 
from entry. This was very probably because an area’s job search practices would also 
influence delivery of the subsequent ‘follow through’ component for those 
persistently unemployed.  
 
The analysis did not find any evidence that local emphasis on encouraging client 
interest in work experience or classroom education, and on providing remedial 
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services for the hard-to-employ, improved outcomes in the latter half of the follow-up 
period. US experience, however, cautions against a hastily negative interpretion.  
These types of action may require periods of five or more years to show a return 
(Couch, 1992; Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2000), whereas the outcome data available 
for the present study extended for only 18 months. To assess developmental and 
remedial aspects of this (and other UK) programmes, one must await the availability 
of data over longer periods. It should also be stressed that this research did not 
directly consider the work experience and educational options. A study similar to the 
present one, but focusing on these options, would require information about the 
conduct of the options themselves, which is not at present available in the 
administrative database. Given such data, the methods used in the present study 
should be applicable. 
 
Finally, this study has considered welfare outcomes rather than impacts, in common 
with much of the literature on local variations in programmes. This has the merit of 
connecting research with the kinds of measures most often used by programme 
administrators to monitor performance. None the less, there is a need to extend the 
approach adopted here to include local programme impacts in the future. 
 
Appendix 1: Instrument tests 
 
Instrumented variable: Unit cost of external services (ESC).  Instruments excluded 
from second stage equation: dichotomised external services cost (ESCHI); 
standardised percentage of youth minorities in local population (ZETHPC).   
 
F-statistic for excluded instruments (d.f. 2, 128): 43.26, P<0.001; partial R2 for 
excluded instruments, 0.44. 
 
Results for Hensen’s overidentification test: 
 
Month* Chi-square (1 d.f.) p 
 
3  2.80   0.09 
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6  0.74   0.39 
9  0.03   0.87 
12  0.00   0.99 
15  0.25   0.62 
18  1.83   0.18 
 
* The other 12 months (not shown) have chi-squares in the range 0.01-2.13, with 
probabilities in the range 0.14-0.96. 
 
For discussion of tests, see Hayashi (2000), Wooldridge (2002). 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
 
1  Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands have also moved towards a work-first approach in 
welfare-to-work programmes (Considine, 2001). 
2   The idea of deterrence was encapsulated in the phrase, often used by members of the UK 
government from the Prime Minister down, that in the programme there would be “no fifth option”: 
meaning no inactivity (since NDYP offered four active options). 
3   Such bias is variously referred to as simultaneity bias or endogeneity bias. 
4   Consistent with this, in the present data the correlation of the youth minority proportion with the 
external service cost was -0.19. 
